Update to File Upload library to return boolean on do_xss_clean().
diff --git a/system/libraries/Upload.php b/system/libraries/Upload.php
index ac9323c..3131469 100644
--- a/system/libraries/Upload.php
+++ b/system/libraries/Upload.php
@@ -276,9 +276,13 @@
* embedded within a file. Scripts can easily
* be disguised as images or other file types.
*/
- if ($this->xss_clean == TRUE)
+ if ($this->xss_clean)
{
- $this->do_xss_clean();
+ if ($this->do_xss_clean() === FALSE)
+ {
+ $this->set_error('upload_unable_to_write_file');
+ return FALSE;
+ }
}
/*
@@ -803,24 +807,55 @@
{
return FALSE;
}
+
+ if (function_exists('memory_get_usage') && memory_get_usage() && ini_get('memory_limit') != '')
+ {
+ $current = ini_get('memory_limit') * 1024 * 1024;
+
+ // There was a bug/behavioural change in PHP 5.2, where numbers over one million get output
+ // into scientific notation. number_format() ensures this number is an integer
+ // http://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=43053
+
+ $new_memory = number_format(ceil(filesize($this->new_name) + $current), 0, '.', '');
+
+ ini_set('memory_limit', $new_memory); // When an integer is used, the value is measured in bytes. - PHP.net
+ }
+
+ // If the file being uploaded is an image, then we should have no problem with XSS attacks (in theory), but
+ // IE can be fooled into mime-type detecting a malformed image as an html file, thus executing an XSS attack on anyone
+ // using IE who looks at the image. It does this by inspecting the first 255 bytes of an image. To get around this
+ // CI will itself look at the first 255 bytes of an image to determine its relative safety. This can save a lot of
+ // processor power and time if it is actually a clean image, as it will be in nearly all instances _except_ an
+ // attempted XSS attack.
+
+ if (function_exists('getimagesize') && @getimagesize($file) !== FALSE)
+ {
+ if (($file = @fopen($file, 'rb')) === FALSE) // "b" to force binary
+ {
+ return FALSE; // Couldn't open the file, return FALSE
+ }
+
+ $opening_bytes = fread($file, 256);
+ fclose($file);
+
+ // These are known to throw IE into mime-type detection chaos
+ // <a, <body, <head, <html, <img, <plaintext, <pre, <script, <table, <title
+ // title is basically just in SVG, but we filter it anyhow
+
+ if ( ! preg_match('/<(a|body|head|html|img|plaintext|pre|script|table|title)[\s>]/i', $opening_bytes))
+ {
+ return TRUE; // its an image, no "triggers" detected in the first 256 bytes, we're good
+ }
+ }
if (($data = @file_get_contents($file)) === FALSE)
{
return FALSE;
}
-
- if ( ! $fp = @fopen($file, FOPEN_READ_WRITE))
- {
- return FALSE;
- }
- $CI =& get_instance();
- $data = $CI->security->xss_clean($data);
-
- flock($fp, LOCK_EX);
- fwrite($fp, $data);
- flock($fp, LOCK_UN);
- fclose($fp);
+ $CI =& get_instance();
+
+ return $CI->security->xss_clean($data, TRUE);
}
// --------------------------------------------------------------------